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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARV 
The study of imperfect competition models has allowed an impressive advance 
in the theory of international trade. The analysis of trade between countries 
showing asymmetric conditions has not caught the attention of economists to 
the same extent, however. This is surprising because trade liberalization 
between countries with very different characteristics is the rule rather that the 
exception. This raises new specific questions about the impact of trade on the 
countries involved. In particular, one may wonder whether trade integration will 
bring about more benefit to a country than to the other and to which extent 
historical advantages tend to persist alter trade. Such questions have been at 
the heart of many 01 the debates on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement or the completion 01 the Single Market within the European Union. 
In this paper we investigate whether a country supplying low quality products 
can catch up with a rival country supplying high quality products when both 
have access to the same technology. Specilically, our main concern is to 
understand the role 01 domestic conditions in determining the international 
success of a lirm. When countries open to trade, lirms start lrom an initiallevel 
of quality 01 their product which depends on local characteristics 01 demando 
The larger and/or more sophisticated the home demand, the higher the quality 
supplied to the domestic customers. In other words, the autarky equilibrium 
(i.e. the quality supplied to the national market when the economy is closed) 
determines the initial conditions 01 the trade game. This is because we want to 
emphasize the role 01 historical lactors in determining the competitive 
advantages of the firms in the international stage. 
Since lirms face a larger (international) market and more competition, the 
autarky choices of quality and price are gene rally not optimal under trade. 
Firms are then given the possibility to update their quality-price decisions by 
paying adjustment costs which increase with the difference between the new 
desired quality and the initial one. In general, lirms would like to be the quality 
leader on the international market since this would yield higher prolits. 
There exist two possible equilibrium outcomes 01 the trade game we have just 
described. In the lirst, 'persistence 01 dominance', the quality leader in the 
trade situation is the lirm which provided the higher quality at autarky. This is 
the firm established in the larger (or richer) country. In the other, 'Ieapfrogging' 
equilibrium, the new leader comes lrom the smaller (or poorer) country. It 
starts with a lower quality than its rival when trade opens, but it manages to 
catch up and get the lead through a larger investment in quality than its rival. 
In other words, we identify the possibility that a firm can make up for its initial 
quality gap des pite the fact that no exogenous change in the available 
technology occurs. 
The existence of the latter equilibrium is subject to two main qualifications, 
however. First when the countries (and hence the initial qualities produced by 
the national firms) are very different the only possible equilibrium is where 
there is persistence of leadership. Intuitively, this is because the additional 
effort that the lagging country should make to take the lead is so large, given 
the initial disadvantage, that the quality it would select would be easily 
overtaken by the leader. 
Second, risk can explain why the 'Ieapfrogging' equilibrium may not be 
attained. To catch up with the initial gap, a higher investment should be made 
by the laggard than by the current leader. The higher the investment required 
by such a 'Ieapfrogging' strategy by the lormer lirm, the higher the risk it would 
involve and the more likely that the firm has to rely on outside lunds to linance 
the operation, thus increasing its cos!. (This is an inlormal explanation 01 the 
risk dominance criterio n used to select between the two equilibria described 
above.) 
Putting these two results together suggests that historical conditions matter a 
lot in the international marketplace. Firms from countries with a larger market, 
or where potential consumers are more eager to get better products tend to 
develop higher quality products which puts them at an advantage in 
international competition. 
Our results seem to lit quite closely with the evidence reported in the business 
literature. For example, in his recent book 'The Competitive Advantages of 
Nations', Michael Porter underlines the importance 01 home demand 
conditions as a determinant 01 national competitive advantages. In particular, 
demand conditions matter not only in terms 01 quantity but also 01 quality. The 
presence of sophisticated consumers putting pressure on national lirms to 
raise the quality 01 their products and services turns out to be a crucial element 
in the international success 01 a firmo This is an outcome that our paper fully 
captures. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the study of imperfect competition models has allowed an impressive 
advance in the theory of intemational trade. However, the analysis of trade between countries 
showing asyrnmetric conditions has not caught much of the attention in the profession. Few 
exceptions can be recalled. Krugman (1980) shows that, in his now standard monopolistic 
competition model of trade, a country with large domestic demand ends up with higher wages 
at the equilibrium because of scale economies. Devereux and Lapham (1994) and Rivera-Bátiz 
and Xie (1993) analyze models with different endowments of knowledge and different sizes 
and show that trade integration may have an adverse effect on specialization and growth of a 
country. Motta (1992) applies an oligopoly model of vertical differentiation to the analysis of 
trade hetween two countries which differ in sizes and finds conditions under which losses from 
tcade may arise for a small country. Finally, Flam and Helpman (1987) consider a model with 
two countries endowed with an efficient and inefficient technology, respectively. They show 
that the advanced country supplies the top quality products while the backward country 
produces and exports the bottom quality ones. However, a switch in the pattem of production 
and trade rnay occur when technical progress is faster in the South than in the North. 
Yet, such a small attention to trade between asyrnmetric countries is surprising. Trade 
liberalization processes between countries with very different characteristics are the rule rather 
than the exception and they raise questions about their effects. In particular, one may wonder 
whether trade integration will bring about more benefit to a country than to tbe other and to 
which extent historical advantages tend to persist after tcade. A similar question has been 
recently addressed by Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993). These authors question the idea 
supported by endogenous growth models that if a country acquires an advantage in 
technologically progressive sectors then this advantage will tend to grow over time. They show 
that a lagging nation may be able to "Ieapfrog" a rival country as a reaction to a major 
exogenous change in technology. The intuition is that a country experienced with an old and 
successful technology will be less ready to adopt the new one than a backward country. A 
similar argument has been proposed in a different context by Nelson and Winter (1981) who 
underline tbat successful flfIIlS may be less eager to change, facilitating tbe task of tbe followers 
in the presence of exogenous changes in the economic environrnent. The same type of issues, 
but in a different perspective, can be found in tbe industrial organization literature which aims at 
understanding whether the leadership of a fmn in a given sector tend to persist or to shrink over 
time (see, e.g. Reinganum (1985), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), Gruber (1992), Budd, Harris 
and Vickers (1994)). 
In this paper, we want to investigate whetber a country supplying low quality products 
can catch up witb a rival country supplying high quality products when botb have access to tbe 
same technology. To this end, we consider an oligopolistic model with vertical product 
differentiation in a two-country setting. Qur main concem is to understand tbe role of domestic 
conditions in determining tbe interoational success of a fmn. When countries open to trade, 
fmns start from an initiallevel of quality of their product which depends on local characteristics 
of demando The larger andlor more sophisticated the home demand, the higher the quality 
supplied to tbe domestic customers. In other words, tbe autarky equilibrium determines tbe 
initial conditions of the trade game. Since firms face a larger (intemational) market and more 
competition, the autarky choices of quality and price are generally not the optimal ones under 
trade. Firms are then given tbe possibility to update their quality-price decisions by paying 
adjustment costs which follow an increasing function of the difference between tbe desired 
quality and tbe initial one (prices can be adjusted costlessly). In general, firms would like to be 
tbe quality leader at tbe equilibrium since this would yie1d higher profits. 
It turos out there exist multiple strict Nash equilibria. In the first Nash equilibrium, the 
leader of the industry in tbe trade situation is tbe firm which provided the higher quality at 
autarky:\ it belongs to tbe larger (or richer) country. We call it "persistence of dominance" 
equilibrium. In the otber Nash equilibrium (we call it "change of leadership" equilibrium or 
"Ieapfrogging" equilibrium), the new leader comes from the smaller (or poorer) country. It 
\ An altemative way 10 express this result is to say tbat the leader when finns update their qualities is the sarne 
as the leader at the short-run trade equilibrium. lndeed, if finns were allowed to change their prices but not their 
qualities at the very moment trade is allowed (or if adjustrnent costs of quality are prohibitive) then the leader in 
the intemational market is the frrm which supplies the higher quality at autarky. See Shaked and SuUon (1984) 
and Motla (1992) for an analysis of short-run trade effects in vertical differentiation models. 
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starts witb a lower quality !han its rival when trade opens, but it manages to catch up and get tbe 
lead through an additional investrnent in quality !han its rival. In otber words, we identify tbe 
possibility tbat "leapfrogging" arises despite the fact that no exogenous change in lhe available 
technology occurs. 
The existence of multiple equilibria is subject to two main qualifications, however. 
Firstly, when tbe countries are very different the only possible equilibrium arising is tbe one 
where tbere is persistence of leadership. Intuitively, !he additional effort tbat tbe laggard should 
make to take !he lead is so large, given tbe initial disadvantage, tbat tbe quality it would select 
would be easily overtaken by tbe leader. 
Secondly, if tbe risk dominance criterium of equilibrium selection (Harsanyi and Selten 
(1988)) is used, the only remaining Nash equilibrium will be the persistence of dominance 
equilibrium. Very loosely speaking, risk can then explain why the "Ieapfrogging" equilibrium 
may not be actually se1ected. To catch up with the initial gap, a higher investment should be 
made by the laggard tban by the current leader. The higher tbe investment required by such a 
"Ieapfrogging" strategy by the laggard, the higher tbe risk it would involve (and tbe more likely 
that tbe fmn has to rely on outside funds to finance tbe operation, tbus increasing its cost). This 
may give sorne intuition about the selection of tbe persistence of leadership equilibrium. 
These two results put together snggest that historical conditions matter a lot on the 
interoational marketplace. Firms which come from countries witb a larger market, or where 
potential consumers are more eager to get better products, tend to develop higher quality 
products and this would put tbem at an advantage in tbe interoational competition. Note tbat the 
role played by tbe national market to determine firms' success has been already suggested by 
Linder (1961) and formalized successively by Krugman (1980) and Dinopoulos (1988) in tbe 
context of monopolistic competition and (spatial) horizontal product differentiation, 
respectively. In tbese models, however, tbe issue of persistence or change of leadership has not 
been addressed. 
Our results also seem to fit quite closely !he evidence reported in tbe business literature. 
For example, Porter (1990) underlines the importance of home demand conditions as a 
determinant of a national competitive advantage in an industry. In particular, demand conditions 
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should be understood not only in tenns oí quantity but also oí quality (Porter says the latter is 
even more important, p.86). The presence oí sophisticated consumers putting pressure on 
national firms to raise the quality oí their products and services tums out to be a crucial element 
in the international success oí a íirm. Unusually stringent local needs and demand 
sophistication explain many stories oí competitive advantage: 
"Scandinavian finns, for example, did well in paper plants, dams, bridges, ports, and hydroelectric power 
generation facilities. ltalian finns did well in road and infrastructure projects, drawing on experience in coping 
with difficult and varied Itailan terrain. Gennan finns did well in constructing chemical and metallurgically based 
process plants. Japanese finns were successful in the construction of steel plants, shipyards, earthquake-proof 
buildings, railways, subways and other mass transit systems, dams (Japan generates a significant amount of 
electricity from hydropower), and aquaculture facilities." (Porter, 1990, p.269). 
This is an outcome that our model fuUy captures. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model to 
the reader and finds the autarky equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the impact of intemational trade 
under the assumption that fums perceive markets as segmented. In section 4, similar results are 
obtained when markets are integrated, i.e. when fums are not able to price discriminate across 
countries (market integration hypothesis). The comparison between these two cases has also 
sorne interest in its own. In particular, it is worth rnentioning that it may not be profitable for a 
finn corning írom a large country to export to the small country under the integrated market 
hypothesis. Since to seU to the smaller/poorer country implies a decrease in the price charged in 
both markets, as long as the small country is "much smaller", it is more profitable to charge a 
high price and seU in the home market only. Furthennore, price discrirnination increases the 
profitability of each fmn in a way that generates an incentive to increase quality. This explains 
why equilibrium qualities sold by the finns are higher when markets are segmented. The 
positive effect played by higher qualities and higher profitability implies that total welfare is 
higher when markets are segmented than when they are integrated. Section 5 concludes the 
papero 
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2. The model and the autarky case2 
Consider two countries A and B with a single finn each. There are two goods, a 
differentiated product whose characteristics are to be chosen by the firrns, and a numéraire 
which can be consumed or used to carry out research and development activities which 
determine the quality of the diíferentiated product. Each country has an initial endowment of the 
numéraire. In country j (j = A, B), there is a population uniformly distributed over the interval 
[o,e j ] with density Si. If a product of quality q is available in country j, the utility of a 
consumer of type e = [O, e j] is given by 
Ua(q,m)=9q+m (1) 
where m denotes the amount of the numéraire bought by this consumer, whose income is given 
and large enough for the consumer to be able to buy if she wants to. When the price of the 
differentiated product is p and its quality q, a consumer buys if and only if his net surplus 
(2) 
is positive, so that the marginal consumer is at 
(3) 
Producing a good oí quality q involves constant marginal cost oí producing the output (that we 
nonnalize to zero) and research and development expenditures given by q 2 /2 units oí the 
numéraire. Accordingly, the national surplus generated by a product oí quality q in country j is 
given by 
2 For simplicity, we have chosen to develop our analysis in the context of a partial equilibrium model. 
However, it could be recast as a general equilibrium model. 
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(4) 
The fmn located in country j chooses its quality and price in order to maximize its profit 
given by 
(5) 
It is readily verified that the profit-maximizing choices in country j are such that 
(6) 
(7) 
Introducing (6) and (7) into (3) shows that the firm always supplies half of the market. Since 
e j I 2 is also the mean of the distribution, we see that both quality and price increase with the 
mean when the mass of consumers is constant. Intuitively, when the marginal willingness-to-
pay of the average consumer is larger, the firm finds it optimal to improve its quality and to 
charge a higher price. Similarly, ceteris paribus an increase in the consumer density leads the 
fmn to raise both its quality and price because the burden of quality improvement falls on fixed 
costs. Evaluating the national surplus (4) at (6) and (7) yields 
(8) 
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3. The impact oC international trade: segmented markets 
Assume now that the two coutries have the same population (Sje j). This assumption 
allows us to neutralize our analysis from market size effects. Without 10ss of generality, let 
SA = 1 and eA ~ e B. Hence, it must be that SB = eA I e B and that qA ~ qB' Furthermore, we 
suppose that the two countries have access to the same technology in producing the 
differentiated producto In other words, countries are identical except for the average marginal 
willingness-to-pay (or, in more business-like terms, except for the sophistication of demand). 
Under these assumptions, it is readily verified that in autarky the quality produced by the firm 
located in country A is higher than the quality produced in country B. The former fmn can then 
be seen as the "quality leader" when the economies are open to intemational trade.3 
In this formalization, the only difference between the two countries is that the average 
propensity to pay for quality is higher in country A. However, interpreting country A as being 
the richer or the larger country is equally possible within this model. As for the interpretation in 
terms of citizens' wealth, we should: (i) notice that one would expect preference for quality -
expressed here by the parameter (J - to be positive!y correlated with incomes; (ii) observe that 
in the type of models studied here higher taste for quality can be associated to 10wer marginal 
utility of income and therefore higher income [Tirole (1988), p.86]. As for the interpretation in 
terms of size differences, one can observe that if the density of consumers in country A were 
equal to the density of consumers in country B (SA = SB) then the market size of A would be 
bigger and in tum the quality advantage enjoyed by country A's firm over its rival would be 
even higher. Hence, all the results obtained below would be strengthened. The same is true for 
3 We are fully aware that our foonulation obviously implies lack of perfect foresight by the agents. When they 
decide on their autarky choice of quality, fions do not anticipate that trade will open at a later stage. In other 
words, fions attach a zero probability to the event that trade opens and when it does, they are taken completely 
by surprise. Although not always unrealistic (fions certainly did not expect that Geonany would be reunified 
when Ihe Berlin Wall fell) our assumption may be thoughl as not completely satisfactory. However, the reader 
should consider Ihat our purpose is lo analyze the role historical conditions play when trade Iiberalization occurS. 
Among Ihe many possible assumplions Ihat we may have used to describe Ihe initial condilion of Ihe trade 
game, we lhink that Ihe autarky equilibrium gives a reasonably acceptable one. 
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the case where SA > S8, with ¡]A equal or larger than 88 • This means that we could interpret 
country A as being the "Iarge" country and country B as being the "small" country. 
We suppose that only one firm operates in each country. In Appendix 1 we show 
conditions under which a monopoly arises endogenously in each market at the autarky 
equilibrium. In particular, it is shown there that if 88 >.219268A then the assumption on 
market demand in the two countries is compatible with the assumption of monopoly in each 
country under autarky. 
We assume that the numéraire is the same for both countries and that the differentiated 
product can be shipped from one country to the other at no cost. When trade is open, we also 
assume that fmns perceive the two markets are segmented (for instance, institutional constraints 
prevent arbitrage between different countries). We shall deal with the case of integrated markets 
in the next section. Because they now face an enlarged market, firms have an incentive to 
modify their quality choices before competing in prices. In so doing, firms incur adjustment 
costs that depend only upon the quality change and are given by (qi - {ji)2 I 2. Consequently, 
the incremental cost increases with the quality change, but its variation is independent of the 
initial quality leve!. The latter assumption means that the technology involves no a priori bias in 
favor of the top or bottom quality fmn. 
Suppose without loss of generality that q¡ > q2' The consumer in country j indifferent 
between buying from either fmn is denoted 9{2 while the consumer indifferent between buying 
or not the differentiated product is 9~ = P~ I q~ . It is irnmediate that 
for j = A, B. (9) 
The national surplus of country j = A, B after the opening to intemational trade is given by: 
(10) 
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when firm i = 1,2 is located in country j, and firm h '#: i is located in country k '#: j. In this 
expression, xt (Xn denotes exports, i.e. the quantity sold by firm i (h) on the foreign market 
k (j). 
The profits of a fmn under intemational trade are defined as follows: 
(11) 
(11 ') 
where q is {jA ifthe fmn was the quality leader at autarky and {j8 otherwise. This corresponds 
to the two different scenarios discussed in the introduction, that is, the one of persistent 
leadership and the case of leapfrogging. 
Consider a pair of given qualities. The equilibrium prices ofthe corresponding subgame 
are (note they do not depend on Si): 
pi* = 8 i q2(q, - q2). 
4q, -q2 
j=A,B 
(12) 
(12') 
Though the national markets are segmented in prices, they are integrated in terms of 
qualities since each fmn offers the same quality on each market. 4 Put in another way, each fmn 
chooses its quality in order to maxirnize the sum of its profits on each market net of the 
adjustrnent costs, given the prices (12) and (12'): 
(13) 
4 A similar approach is adopted by Venables (1990) where firms choose a single capacity for the whole 
production bUI choose different prices in each market. 
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j,k=A,B and J~k. 
(13') 
Since the equilibrium qualities depend on the qualities produced under autarky as wel! as on the 
taste preferences of consumers in the two countries, the determination of the equilibrium is 
especially complex, though we use a simple model. 
Because no analytical expression can be found for the equilibrium of the quality game, 
we have solved it for different values of O A, using the computer program Mathernatica. Al! the 
results are qualitatively the same for different values of this parameter. Hence, we characterize 
here the equilibriurn for O A = 10, for the sake of simplicity. Thus O B may vary between O and 
10. There are two candidate equilibria, which are given by the two quality pairs which satisfy 
the first order conditions corresponding to the system of the derivatives of (14) and (15) (see 
Appendix 2). 
In one candidate equilibrium, the leader is the firm from country A, which had the 
higher quality under autarky: q, = qA and q2 = qB. In the other, the leader is the firm from 
country B: q, = qs' and q2 = q/. These candidate equilibria are obtained subject to the 
condition that firm i provides the higher quality and firmj the lower quality. However, for the 
candidate equiJibria to be equilibria we must check that firm i (resp. firm j) does not find it 
profitable to deviate and produce a lower (resp. higher) quality than its rival. In other words, 
the firm supposed to be the quality leader should not have an incentive to provide a quality 
lower than its competitor; and vice versa. We now show under which conditions these 
candidate equiJibria are the Nash equilibria of the quality game as depicted in Figure l. 
Figure 2 shows that the persistence of leadership (q, =qA,q2 =qB) is always an 
equilibrium. Indeed, at this qualily pair, the firms earn profits nA and n B. If the firm from 
country A decided to deviate and to produce the best possible quality subject to this quality 
being lower than qB' it would obtain lower profits nA (l). Likewise, the fmn from country B 
does not find it profitable to deviate and to produce the higher quality. The leader produces a 
quality qA which is much higher than the quality produced in autarky by the fmn from country 
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B. If the latter tried to catch up with the rival fmn's quality, it would have to incur a big 
adjustment cost. But to catch up would not be enough, since price competition would reduce to 
zero gross profits despite the major investment in quality. The firm from country B should then 
significantly increase its quality beyond the candidate equilibrium quality qA. However, this 
would increase so much its adjustment costs that the highest profits nB(l) it can obtain by 
deviating would be negative. 
Figure 3 analyzes the case of "change of leadership" along the same lines. In this case, 
though, the firm from country A may have an incentive to deviate from the candidate 
equilibrium quality. Indeed, when country B's demand shows much less preference for quality 
than country A's, the fmn located in country B starts the international trade game with a quality 
disadvantage. Given the adjustment costs it has to incur to reach the desired quality level, the 
latter cannot be very large (notice frorn Figure 1 that the lower OB the lower qs'). Therefore, 
the additional investment cost rnade by the firm from country A to setect a quality sufficiently 
higher than qs' is the more affordable the lower 0B. Figure 1 also shows that the best quality 
choice that the firm from country A can do conditional on its rival choosing the candidate 
equilibrium quality gives it a profit nA I (1) > nA I for OB < 3.2. The former has then an incentive 
to deviate by providing the higher quality. In other words, whereas the persistent leader 
equilibriwn exists for the whole set of parameter values, the "change of leadership" equilibrium 
exists only when OB exceeds some critical value, i.e. OB~3.2. This explains why in Figure 1 
the equilibrium qualities corresponding to the "leapfrogging" equilibrium are drawn only for 
these values of the parameter. 
Figure 4 shows welfare in each country under the two types of equilibria, where they 
existo First of all, one notices that the welfare of a country is always higher when the domestic 
firm is the quality leader at the trade equilibrium:: WA > W/ and Ws'> WB. This is mainly 
because the equilibrium profit earned by the top quality firm is always higher than the profit 
earned if it were the bottom quality fmn. Secondly, we!fare levels are increasing with OB. This 
is because the qualities also increase with 0B' which has a positive effect on consumer surplus. 
The closer the market demands of the two countries are, the higher the quality of country B's 
fmn at autarky. In turn, this means that this firm can afford a higher leve! of quality (it has to 
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pay lower adjustment costs for any given level of desired quality) and that the rival fmn has to 
push upward its desired quality leve!. Thirdly, the comparison of world welfare levels shows 
that the more efficient equilibrium is the one where there is persistence of leadership. This 
market configuration allows to save on adjustment costs and to reach higher levels of quality 
than in the case of change of leadership. 
4. The impact of international trade: integrated markets 
In the previous section, we have analyzed intemational trade under the assumption that 
fmns can charge different prices in the two markets they face. In sorne cases, firms cannot price 
discriminate because of legal constraints or because of arbitrage by consumers. This is the case 
dealt with in the present section. 
Before starting the computations of the equilibria, we should notice that the constraint of 
charging the same price in both countries might not render profitable the exports in sorne cases. 
Suppose that the consumers located in country B have a very low average taste for quality 0B' 
These consumers have a low willingness to pay and to capture them a low price should be seto 
However, this implies reducing the price in the more profitable market A, where consumers 
have a high willingness to pay for the good. The reduction in profit in the more sophisticated 
market A may therefore outweigh the additional profit brought by sales in country B. 
There are two possible sub-cases which should be studied: (i) both fmns seU in both 
countries; (ii) firm A sells only in its own market (it tums out that it is never profitable for the 
fmn from country B not to serve its local market). 
When demand in both markets is supplied, we have: 
(14) 
( 14') 
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where q is liA if the fmn was the quality leader at autarky and liB otherwise. Indeed, like in 
the case of segmented markets, the two cases of persistence and change of leadership may 
arise. Equilibrium prices at the price subgame are: 
_ 4q¡(q¡ -q2)OAOB 
p¡- (4q¡-q2)(e A +e B) 
_ 2q2(q¡ - Q2)8AOB 
P2 - (4q¡ -q2)(e A + eB)" 
After substitution we find the expression of profits as a function of qualities: 
(q¡_q)2 
2 
(15) 
( 15') 
(16) 
(16') 
Like in section 3, we take O A = 10 and we are able to find an analytical solution to the 
first order conditions of the system aboye with the help of a computer prograrnme (see 
Appendix 3). In the first pair of solutions the leader is the firm from country A: 
q¡ = qA and q2 = qB' In the second, the leader is the firm from country B: 
q¡ = qB I and q2 = qA I • Before conc1uding that these two pairs represent the equilibria, though, 
we have to check two points. 
Firstly, as done in the case of segmented markets, we have to see whether at the 
candidate equilibrium the firm providing the low (high) quality does not have any incentive to 
switch to the high (low) quality given the quality chosen by the rival firm at the candidate 
equilibrium. It turns out that, like for the case of segmented markets, the persistent leader 
13 
equilibrium always exists, whereas the leapfrogging equilibrium exists only when 8B is large 
enough, i.e. 8 B ~ 3.95. This is done as in section 3. 
More interesting is the new situation arising because of the constraint that the firms set 
the same price in the two different markets. As said aboye, we must check that the high quality 
firm finds it more profitable to seU in both countries.5 In faet, this is not always the case. 
When the high quality is sold in country A only,6 profit earned by the high and the low 
quality firm are respectively: 
(17) 
( 17') 
It is standard to find the equilibrium prices for any subgame and, then, to use them so as 
to obtain the profit as a function of qualities: 
(18) 
(18') 
As aboye, we set 8,0. = 10 and find an analytical solution to the frrst order conditions 
corresponding to this system by making use of a computer programo We have then proceeded 
to compare the profits associated to the strategy of selling in country A only with the profits 
corresponding to sales in both markets. It turns out that when the leader is the firm which 
5 Since Ihe low quality producI is mainly addressed lO consumers having a lower willingness lO pay, tbe firm 
producing tbe low quality always finds il more profitable lo sen in botb markets. 
6 For simplicity, we assume lbal country B's consumers cannol buy tbe high qualily products from country A 
directly. 
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started with the high quality at autarky, then this flITD prefers to seU in the local market A only 
rather than selling in both markets as long as 8 B < 2.75.7 For higher values of the willingness 
to pay of the residents of country B, the firm prefers to serve both countries. As for the change 
of leadership equilibrium, we know that this exists only where 8B ~ 3.95. In this interval the 
average willingness to pay of the consumers in country B is high enough for the flITD to fmd it 
more profitable to supply both markets. 
Figure 5 and 6 illustrate qualities and profits at the two equilibria. Note that at the 
persistence of leadership equilibrium, qualities exhibit a discontinuity when 8 B == 2.75. Indeed, 
this is the point where the firm from country A switches from serving only the domestic market 
to serving both markets. As the monopoly in the local market vanishes, this creates a 
discontinuity in both the low quality firm's profit, which shift downward, and in the welfare 
functions, which shift upward (see Figure 7). The latter is due to the increase in consumer 
surplus in both countries when the leader supplies both markets. The consumers located in 
country B gain because, with the flow of exports from country A, they have access to higher 
quality. Those located in country A gain because of a decrease in prices. Indeed, in order to 
supply the foreign market, the price set intemationally by the leader decreases to the benefit of 
the consumers in country A who would have consumed the good at a higher price otherwise. 
On the whole, therefore, the results obtained under segmented and integrated markets 
are very similar. The two equilibria which arise share similar features and the leapfrogging 
equilibrium exists only when the two markets are not too different, in the sense that 8 B must be 
higher than a certain threshold. It is also worth comparing the equilibrium values under the two 
altemative market pricing systems. Qualities and profits are lower under integrated markets than 
under segmented markets for either equilibrium and eaeh firm, provided that the quality leader 
supplies both markets, as shown in Figures 8 and 9 in the case of persistence of leadership. 
When firms cannot discriminate with respect to the price they can charge in the different 
markets, their profitability decreases. In tum, this reduces the incentive to invest to enhance the 
quality offered. This gives also an intuition as to why the threshold level of 8 B aboye which 
7 Barros and Martinez-Giralt (1994) analyze a horizontal producI differentiation model witb asyrnmetric countries 
and also find conditions under which a firm prefers nOI lO export when markets are integraled. 
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tbe change of leadersip equilibrium exists is higher in the case of integrated markets tban under 
segmented markets. Since qualities tend to be lower when fmns cannot price discriminate, firm 
A needs a lower investment to deviate from the candidate equilibrium and select a quality higher 
tban tbe quality tbat tbe leader from country B would offer. This calls for a stronger condition 
for the leapfrogging equilibrium to existo 
As for the welfare comparison, tbe results are c1earcut but less straightforward. In 
particular, it can be seen from Figures 10 and 11 tbat both in the persistence of leadership and 
in the change of leadership equilibria, the following rankings hold under the proviso that both 
markets are served by tbe top quality firm: 
(19) 
where the indices S and 1 refer to segmented and integrated markets respectively, while tbe 
index TOT refers to world we1fare. The intuition for the aboye inequalities is as follows. When 
markets are integrated, tbe prices of each product can be seen as sorne kind of weighted average 
between tbe prices !hat each firm would charge in each single market if it were allowed to do it. 
Given that market A's consumers have a higher willingness to pay tban those in country B, it 
can be shown tbat: 
(i=I,2). (20) 
Therefore, for any given pair of qualities on offer, !he consurners in country B tend to be better 
off under segmented markets tban under integrated markets,8 while tbe opposite is true for the 
consumers located in country A. This should help explain the ranking of welfare indicators 
given aboye. Of course, this reasoning holds for identical qualities in segmented and integrated 
markets, which is not what happens in equilibrium. Under segmented markets, qualities are 
higher than when firms cannot price discriminate. However, this effect tends to increase 
8 This conc¡usion is strengthened by the fact that when finns cannot price discriminate the high quality finn 
may wish not to serve country B's market. 
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consumers' welfare (and firms' profits) in the same direction in both countrles. Put togetber, 
these two effects explain why world welfare is higher under segmented markets whereas 
country A (resp. B) is better off under integrated markets (resp. segmented markets). This 
result invites us to reconsider the c1aim made in the intemational trade literature that market 
integration is socially better tban market segmentatian (see, e,g. Smitb and Venables (1988) and 
more recently, Anderson, Schmitt and Thisse (1994) and Barros and Martinez-Giralt (1994». 
This is because our model can account for endogenous product choice, whereas the 
aforementioned papers deal witb products whose specification is exogenously given. 
5. Equilibrium selection 
The game we have described has two strict Nash equilibria for a whole range of values 
of (j B. Standard refinements such as perfectness, propemess, or strategic stability do not select 
among strict Nash equilibria. There is a notable exception, though, which is the concept of 
risk-dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Let a 2x2 game with the following 
payoff matrix: 
B¡ B2 
A¡ a¡¡,bll a12,b12 
where the payoffs are such that E¡=(A¡,B¡) and E2=(A2,B2) are strict Nash equilibria. Let 
LA 1 =a ll-a2¡, that is LA ¡ is the gain made by player A by predicting rightly that the other player 
will play El (and best responding to the prediction) instead of predicting wrongly that the otber 
player will play E2 (and best responding to the prediction). Similarly, let LBl=b¡l-b12, 
LA2=a22-a12, LB2=b22-b21. We say that equilibrium El risk dominates equilibrium E2 when 
LA¡LBl > LA2LB2. Therefore, the risk dominance concept selects the equilibrium to which 
corresponds the highest gains to tbe players for a correet forecast of the equilibrium 
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Besides the intuition and the axiomatization provided by Harsanyi and Selten, there are 
more reasons why risk dorninance could be considered a good equilibrium selection criterion 
(see Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Carlsson and van Darnme (1993)). Perhaps the 
most appealing argument for risk dorninance is that in experiments perforrned by Van Huyck, 
Battalio and Beil (1990) for a pure coordination garne, the risk dorninant equilibrium is the one 
selected by actual players. 
For the game under consideration, the risk dorninance criterion selects the equilibrium 
with persistence of leadership.9 Let E) be the persistence of leadership equilibrium and E2 the 
leapfrogging equilibrium. Recall that A is the country with higher preference for quality and B 
the country with lower preference for quality. 
In our case a\J=1t)(qA,qB), a2)=1t)(qA',qB), a\2=1t)(qA,qB') and a22=1t2(qB',qA'). 
Also bll=1t2(qA,qB), b2)=1t2(qA',qB), b\2=1t2(qA,qB') and b22=1t) (qB',qA'). With segmented 
markets 1t), 1t2 are given by equations (13), (13'), while they are given by equations (16), 
(16') with integrated markets. 
In our case, LA) is what player A gains by forecasting rightly that the other player will 
play the persistence of leadership equilibrium, instead of forecasting wrongly that the other 
equilibrium arises. The interpretation of LB), LA2 and LB2 is analogous. Figures 12 and 13 
show that LA) > LB2 and LB) > LA2 (except when 88 =10, the syrnrnetric case).10 
Equilibrium selection can be interpreted in a strong way or in a weak way. The strong 
interpretation is that we will never (or rarely) observe players choosing the strategies that lead 
to an equilibrium that is not selected. The weak interpretation is that the likelihood of observing 
players using the strategies that lead to each equilibrium is related to the difference LA)LB) -
LA2LB2· The larger this difference, the more likely it is that we will observe players using the 
E) strategies. We feel that the weak interpretation is more reasonable, not only because it is 
more difficult to reject, but also because most of the reasons in favor of risk dorninance involve 
9 In the limiting case where the two countries have equal populations, risk dorninance predicts Ihat !he mixed 
strategy equilibriurn will be the one played. 
10 Note that Ihe Figures are drawn only for those parameter values where bolh equilibria existo 
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uncertainty or a certain lack of rationality (Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p.89)). In such 
circumstances it would be hard to expect the strong interpretation to be satisfied. 
6. Conclusions 
The impact of intemational trade on asyrnrnetric econornies is an important issue as 
shown, for instance, by the debates which take place in North America (NAFTA) and the 
European Union. Similarly, it is still an open question whether less advanced countries can 
make up for their disadvantages in intemational competition. Our analysis reveals that lagging 
countries may be able to catch up with the more advanced countries if they are willing to make 
sufficiently large investments in R&D, at least when they have access to the sarne technology. 
However, this does not occur when the initial quality gap is too large. 11 Furtherrnore, our 
discussion of the equilibrium selection suggests that the leading countries are likely to keep their 
leadership, even when leapfrogging is also an equilibrium. 
Since products are selected endogenously by the firrns, total welfare is higher when 
markets are segrnented. This is due to the fact that firrns earn higher profits, other things being 
equal, when they can price discrirninate, thus leading firrns to choose higher quality products. 
This contrasts with conventional wisdom, in which product differentiation is exogeneous, 
where integrated markets are considered as being preferable. 
Our analysis is incomplete in several respects. First, it would be interesting to extend the 
analysis to the case of several firrns in each country. Second, we do not deal with the impact of 
trade on the labor market. One may expect workers of the poorer country to be less productive, 
thus making our assumption that firms have access to the same technology somewhat 
problematic. The key question is then to determine where the technological innovations take 
place and where plants are located. 
11 In a cornpletely different setting, Rodrik (1994) finds results which are rerniniscent of ours. If an econorny 
has sufficiently low (high) skilllevel of its workforce, it will specialize only in Ihe low-technology (resp. high-
tech) goods. However, for intermediate levels of Ihe skilllevel, rnultiple equilibria are possible, and an econorny 
rnay specialize in eilher low- or high-tech goods. 
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Appendix 1. Monopoly in autarky as an endogenous market structure 
In this appendix we determine the values of the parameters for which a natural monopoly 
would arise in each country when economies are closed. In other words, we show that a 
monopoly is the endogenous market structure in both countries under sorne assumptions on 
fixed costs and taste parameters. 
A monopolist in country j (j=A,B) would choose the price and quality given by (6) and 
(7). It then eams a profit Trj =. 0312Sj 2 9j 4 - F, where F is a fixed cost that must be incurred to 
begin production (but that the fmns do not have to pay when the trade game starts), regardless 
of the quality chosen. 
If two firms were to enter the market under autarky, the equilibrium fmns' profits would 
be given by Tr'j =.0244S/9/ - F and Tr2j =.OOI5S/0/ - F (see Motta (1993». Hence, for 
onIy one firm to be in each market, we must have.OOI5S/0/ < F <.03l2S/0/. Since this 
condition must hold for both countries, and given the assumption that SB = 9~SA and SA = 1, it 
OB 
must be that.OOI50/ <.03129/9/, which amounts to 9B >.219269A. 
Appendix 2. Determination of the equilibria of the international trade 
game: segmented markets 
Equations (13) and (13') give the expression ofprofits in tbe quality stage ofthe game. 
The first derivatives can be computed as: 
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(A2.!) 
j,k=A,B and j;tk 
(A2.1') 
By equating (A2.1) and (A2.1 ') to zero, we then have two different systems of first order 
conditions: one for the case where the leader at the trade equilibrium is from country A and the 
other when the leader is from country B. Unfortunately, these systems cannot be solved such 
as they stand by Mathematica. Sorne additional work is needed to obtain the solutions. 
Let us start with the case of persistence of leadership. Writing q, = rq2 (with r~I), 
replacing qA and qB with the values in expression (6), taking 9 A = 10 and dividing the first 
order conditions between tbem yields: 
4rq2- IOO _ 4(4r2-3r+2) 
4Q2-IOOB- r(4r-7) (A2.2) 
from which we can write: 
5(35r-20r2 +49B -6r9B +8r29 B) 
Q2 = 8 -12r+ 23r2 _4r3 (A2.3) 
Substituting (A2.3) in either of the two frrst order conditions,we obtain an equation in r and 9B 
which is very cumbersome. Since we are interested in finding a solution for r~l, the only root 
to consider is as follows: 
d -e+2b+8a2+c+--~~-=~3-r====~==== 
.J e + b + 4a2 - c '-_______ 1_2_8_0-'-( 2_+_0_B.:...) _-V_b_+_4_a_2_-_c_+_e 
r=a+ 2 +- 2 (A2.4) 
where a, b, c, d, e are : 
and where: 
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18640+ 3574+ 171(9Bt 
S(2+0B}Vi5y 
y=[-I1575800-17355606B -457386B +1206(6Bf + 
,fj (10+ 6 B)2770486846000+ 1661069976806B +17270707788(6 B)2 +1021119318(6Bf + 25485867(6Bt ]1/3 
Once r is obtained (which tums out to be a decreasing and convex function of ¡jB), 
substituting allows us to find out all the equilibrium values of the other variables in the case of 
persistence of leadership. 
The same procedure can be followed to find the analytical solution for the case of change 
of leadership. In this case, the expression (A2.2) and (A2.3) become: 
4rq2 -lO¡jB _ 4(4r2 -3r+2) 
4q2 -100 - r(4r-7) 
5(SO-120r+l60r2 +7rOB _4r20B) 
q2 = 2(S-12r+23r2-4r3) 
(A2.5) 
(A2.6) 
By replacing (A2.6) in one of the first order conditions we then obtain an equation in r and O B 
which can be solved as in the case of persistence of leadership. It tums out that the r which 
sol ves our problem is an increasing and concave function of O B. It also has the same structure 
as in expression (A2.4), but that a,b,c,d,e are different functions of OB. We omit tIle· 
expression of r in this case since we believe that very little can be gained by inspection of such a 
long and messy expression. In fact, the reader may wonder why we decided to put the exact 
expressions of the solution (at least for one case) in the fust place. The main reason for that is 
that we wanted to illustrate the method we have used and to stress that the problem had an 
analytical solution, albeit one which can be obtained only by means of a specialized computer 
programo This means that everybody who has a program like Maple, Mathematica will be able 
to compute the equilibrium qualities of the game. This can be done with very few instructions 
and by making use of expressions (A2.1)-(A2.3). To check that qualities and other equilibrium 
values take the form given in the figures presented in the text is then just a matter of 
substitution. 
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To check that the solutions thus obtained represent an equilibrium is then 
*aightforward. Suppose we consider the candidate equilibrium (qA,qB) as found aboye. First, 
we should see whether firm A does not have an incentive to produce a quality lower than 
q2 < qB' If it produced such a quality. its profit would be given by expression (15), where 
tr2 = tr2(q2lql = qB)' One has then to compute the value of tr2 under the optimal value q2' The 
same should then be done for firm B, to check it is not profitable to deviate and produce 
ql > qA' The deviation would give it the profit indicated by expression (14) for 
trI = trI (qllq2 = qA)' The optimal quality ofthe deviation and the corresponding profit can then 
be computed (see Figure 2). 
For tbe case of change of leadership, the procedure is exactIy tbe same (see Figure 3). 
Appendix 3. Determination oC the equilibria oC the international trade 
game: integrated markets. 
Expressions (16) and (16') give profits of the firms under the hypothesis that both 
markets are served by both frrms. The frrst order conditions are: 
(A3.1) 
(A3.1') 
We can then use the same procedure as in the previous appendix. By setting q, = zq2 
(with z~l), dividing the first order conditions and rearranging terms, we obtain for the case of 
persistence of leadership: 
5( 40B + 35z - 20Z2 - 6z0 B + 8Z 20 B) 
q2 = (8-12z+23z2 _4Z3) (A3.2) 
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For the case of change of leadership the above expression becomes: 
'_ S(SO-120z+ 160z2 + 7z¡P -4z 2¡P) 
% - 2(S-12z+23z2 - 4z3 ) (A3.3) 
By replacing (A3.2) in the case of persistence of leadership and (A3.3) in the case of 
leapfrogging into either (A3.1) or (A3.1'), we then obtain an equation in z andfjB. The 
anaIytical solutions z( eB ) which we do not give here are decreasing and convex in eB for 
leader persistence and increasing and concave in e B for leapfrogging. By substitution one can 
find the equilibrium qualities. 
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Figure 1 - Qualities, in the persistent leader equilibrium (qj) and 
in the change of leadership equilibrium (q'j)' in the caee of 
segmented markets (j-A.B). 
1500 
1000 
500 
-500 
-1000 
-
- -
- - - --
6 8 10 
------ - - --
- -
Figure 2 : Analysis of the existence of equilibrium for the case of persistence of leadership; 
XJ = profits of frrm J=A,B at the candidate equilibrium and XJ(I) = profits of 
frrm J=A,B after deviation. 
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Figure 3: Analysis of the existence of equilibrium for the case of change of leadership; 
x'J = profits of firm J=A,B at the candidate equilibrium and x' .J<I) = profits 
of firm J=A,B after deviation. 
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Figure 4 - Country and world _lfare, in the peraiatent leader equilibrium 
(Wj'WTOT) and in the ehange of leaderahip equilibrium (W'j'W'TOT) 
in the eaae of aegmented marketa (j-A,B). 
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Figure 5 - Qualitiea, in the peraiatent leader equilibrium (qj) and 
in the change of leaderahip equilibrium (q'j)' in the eaae of 
integrated marketa (jsA,B). 
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Figure 6 - Firma' profita, in the peraiatent leader equilibrium (ltj) and 
in the change of leaderahip e~ilibrium (It'j)' in the caae of 
integrated marketa (j=A,B). 
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Figure 7 - Country and world welfare, in the peraiatent l.&dar equilibrium 
(Wj' WTOT ) and in the changa of leaderahip equilibrium (W' j' W' TOT) 
in the caae of integrated marketa (j_A,B). 
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Figure 8 - Pereietence of leaderehip, Bquilibrium qualitiee 
under eegmented (qjS) and integrated markete (qjX). 
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Figure 9 - Pereietence of leaderBhip, Bquilibrium profite 
under eegmented (KjS) and integrated markete (KjX). 
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Figure 10- Persistence of 1eadarship: Country j's walfare (j-A,B) and 
world walfare under segmentad (WjS,WTOTS ) and integrated 
markets (WjI,WTOT1 ). 
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Figure 11_ Change of 1eadership: Country j's and world welfare under 
segmented (W'jS,W'TOTS ) and integrated markets (W'jI,W'TOT1 ). 
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Figure 12 - Risk Dominance Comparisons - Segmented markets Figure 13 - Risk Dominance Comparisons - Integrated Markets 
